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in calibre: “SUID Mount Helper has 5 Major Vulnerabilities” -
2011-11-04 02:36:43 GMT
After these answer to a vulnerability report I'll consider to only run Calibre in a virtualbox.
These are _local_ exploits, no? If so, who cares?
A local exploit is a way to privilege escalation. Some low-impact remote vulnerability can possibly be combined with this for full-scale rootkit fun. Social engineering is far easier when it does not involve making the target type 'sudo'.
I figure that once an attacker has access to my user account, I'm fucked. Why would they even need root, what is there for them to find? (I'm speaking here about setups that are likely to include calibre, not "servers" and other such semi-mythical multi-user beasts)
: you back up your documents (well, some might have leaked), remove your account or maybe just change password. Your software is intact. Other users are unaffected. The attacker can't run SMTP or HTTP server on its usual ports, etc. Your box is a lot less interesting.
Exactly: "other users", "SMTP or HTTP server on their usual ports", etc. Not the kind of setup where calibre is usually used. Root access is kind of worthless on a typical desktop or laptop. And so is the traditional Unix security model in general (just think how many groups your user has to be a member of before you can have fun with your Linux desktop, or how much thought you are usually giving that Gnome dialog that asks you for a root password).
SMTP and HTTP is for setting up spoof servers, spam relays, etc. Not for replacing your analogous legitimate servers. Sending spam can be done from an unprivileged account all right, that's true, though. Network-facing things should be sandboxed, but it's sort of not figured yet, because it would hamper the cherished desktop integration.
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